A Look at the Non Identity Problem

A Look at the Non-Identity Problem

In this paper I will be discussing the non-identity problem. I will explain the non-identity problem using the example of a future oil spill. I will then look at ways of solving this dilemma through using an argument posed by Molly Gardner and the case she uses to argue against her claim. Next, I will offer my own example in support of her argument and the refutation of it; to see how Gardner would likely respond. To understand the non-identity problem, suppose a Canadian subsidized oil company causes a spill that will harm people 200 years in the future. The non-identity problem can be understood as trying to justify a solution to this problem. This can be summarized by the following:

The government subsidizes an oil company who causes a spill which harms future people.
Though it is agreed that the oil company has harmed these people, the people are not worse off than they otherwise would have been.

This is because the only other alternative is non-existence, and though they are living with poor health conditions, they would not be the same person without it. They would be someone completely different, thus a non-identical person.

Despite this being a “bad” act, it is contradicting because it is morally right since the people 200 years into the future that have been made worse off, are not worse off than they would have been.
The non-identity problem is seen in (4) that in some cases of our actions, it is hard to explain how some would better off had that action not occurred, as it would result in non-existence. In the example of the oil spill, the government is not morally wrong in subsidizing the oil company because despite the health problems caused to the future people, they are not worse off than they would have been otherwise. Existing with a flawed life is better than not existing at all.

One potential solution which someone could argue is what Molly Gardner calls “the non-comparative account of harming.” That means that the badness of the state an individual is in, should not come from comparing it to what it would be like, had it not occured. First though, a harm is to be considered as Elizabeth Harman states as anything which “pain, mental or physical discomfort, disease, deformity, disability, or death” (430). Gardner uses the case of two women, Alice and Barbara to show the difference between these harms and their respective cases. In this example, Alice and Barbara are both trying to harm their future babies, but take different methods to do so. Alice takes a drug which causes harm to her baby. Barbara uses genetic testing to single out a defective gene which will cause her baby to be harmed by it. Though in both of these cases it is clear to see that both women harmed their babies, one is a non-identity case while the other is not. This is because in Alice’s case she knowingly took a drug which caused harm to her baby and if she had not then her baby would have been presumably born healthy. In Barbara’s case, the only alternative to her actively selecting a faulty gene, would be having her baby not exist. However, in the “non-comparative account of harming,” it is able to be concluded that Barbara has indeed caused harm to her baby. It shows that an individual may be harmed if it meets the basic principles of what constitutes harm, according to Harman’s list. This is able to argue in favour of the non-identity case as it is able to show that actions can harm, even though without them an individual may not exist.

However, the “non-comparative account of harming” is not able to solve all non-identity cases, such as what Gardner calls the Loss of Fortune case. This case can be understood as follows: There was a world renowned physicist named Jeeves. Jeeves had a stroke and it caused him to have average intelligence. Technically, Jeeves has not been harmed as it only having average intellect is not viewed as a harm, according to the list Harman qualifies as harms. Though in the non-comparative account of harming, average intellect is not considered like death, disability or being severely maimed. His now average intellect according to the non-comparative account, is not a harm, thus, his stroke did not harm him. However, this does not match the intuition about what occurred to Jeeves because we know that he has been harmed in someway. It is in cases like these, where it can be seen how the non-comparative account is unable to provide a correct answer as to what actions constitute harm.

Despite this objection to the non-comparative account, it can be seen that there are still ways for a proponents to argue against the Loss of Fortune case and be in favour of the non-comparative account of harming. This can be done through revising Harman’s original list as to what constitutes a “bad” harm. Gardner provides examples of potential revisions but they can be easily argued against. Therefore, I propose revising what constitutes as “bad” as being the following:
“A harm is anything which, relative to an individual, negatively disrupts the circumstances he/she currently lives in and without comparison to any other state.”

If this redefined meaning for what constitutes a harm is adopted, it is then able to meet the criteria for solving the Loss of Fortune case. The two other potential revisions to the meaning of a harm that Gardner give fail for various reasons. For example, they either are species dependant or demand for one to have will. However, my proposed revision is neither dependant on species, nor the will they may hold. It is able to solve the Loss of Fortune case as it is able to understand that Jeeves was harmed. Prior to my revision, becoming of average intelligence was not classified as a harm as it was not included on the list. In my definition, it can be seen that the stroke harms Jeeves because the lowering of intelligence has harmed the way Jeeves lives. Moreover, my revision understands that Jeeves circumstances are unique to him and being of average intellect is damaging to him, but also notes that it may not be to others.

One way that Gardner could respond that the Loss of Fortune is a counterexample to the non-comparative account of harming, is by arguing against my revision of what qualifies as a harm. Gardner may propose that it does not matter what the circumstances an individual lives in, relative to themself. This is because at any given time there is only one shared circumstance that individuals collectively live in. Basing a potential harm that an individual may face off of his/her particular circumstances should not be the foundation for the redefinition of a harm. Specific to the Loss of Fortune example, if anything which negatively disrupts one’s own typical circumstances is a harm who is to say what would negatively disrupt it. If that is the case, then it be seen that a harm is dependant upon circumstances. As mentioned previously, if we know now that there is one set of circumstances which we all collectively live in, then how are we able to determine a harm based off of this? In Jeeves’ case, we can see that if we are basing the harm off the his present circumstances and the job he has etc. Who is to say then what follows is that average intelligence constitutes a harm? His circumstances are not unique to him, as Jeeves exists in more than just his own life. Who is to say that average intelligence would hinder him in his life? (Basing a harm off of just himself and how he lives.) This revised definition fails to be reason enough to say that he has been harmed, as he serves more than just a purpose at his job and who is to say he will be unable to achieve well. A lack of effectiveness in ability is just that-a limit on ones effectiveness-but it does not follow that that becomes a harm. Thus, it can be seen that Gardner would prove my revision wrong and that it is able to serve as a counterexample to the non-comparative account of harming.

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